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ACADEMIC TREATMENT OF
ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA
IN LEADING FAMILY LAW
TEXTBOOKS
PROLIFE CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS
In order to "identify, catalog, and respond to current academic
coverage of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in law school
teaching materials,"' the six leading textbooks for American family
law courses were analyzed. These texts include: Family Law: Cases,
Materials and Problems, by Peter N. Swisher, Anthony Miller, and
Jana B. Singer; Domestic Relations: Cases and Problems, by Homer
H. Clark Jr. and Ann Laquer Estin; Modern Family Law, by D. Kelly
Weisberg and Susan Frelich Appleton; Family Law, by Leslie Joan
Harris, June Carbone, and Lee E. Teitelbaum; Family Law: Cases,
Text, Problems, by Ira Mark Ellman, Paul M. Kurtz, Elizabeth S.
Scott, Lois A. Weithorn, and Brian H. Bix; and Contemporary
Family Law, by Douglas E. Abrams, Naomi R. Chan, Catherine J.
Ross, and David D. Meyer.2
Many textbooks convey a "right-to-choice" approach, which
is mostly portrayed through the selection of notes chosen to
accompany the cases. This report will first analyze the textbooks'
treatment of euthanasia, followed by an analysis of the treatment of
abortion. Because the textbooks surveyed do not include a discussion
1. Grant Proposal, Prolife Center at University of St. Thomas, Life Issues in the Law School
Curriculum, 2 (2010) (on file with Prof. Teresa Collett).
2. PETER N. SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER, & JANA B. SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (2nd ed. 1998); HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS (6th ed. 2000); D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN
FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2010); LESLIE
JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE, & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2010); IRA MARK
ELLMAN, PAUL M. KURTZ, ELIZABETH S. SCOTT, Lois A. WEITHORN, & BRIAN H. BIX, FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2004); and DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CHAN,
CATHERINE J. RoSS, & DAVID D. MEYER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW (2nd ed. 2009).
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of infanticide, this report does not summarize the textbooks'
approaches to that issue.
EUTHANASIA
Despite the familial implications of the United States
Supreme Court's "right to die" decisions, the majority of leading
family law textbooks evaluated do not include any discussion of
euthanasia or a reference' to the monumental decisions in the area.4
Two textbooks' include Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health as
a note case. Harris introduces the case with the statement, "As a
constitutional matter, family members do not have the right to make
health care decisions for their incompetent family members,"
followed by approximately one page of excerpts from the majority
opinion.6 Clark summarizes the Cruzan opinion in a lengthy
paragraph, stating that while the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a person with a liberty interest to
refuse medical treatment, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid
Missouri's insistence that when the right is asserted by a surrogate,
the evidence of the incompetent person's wishes must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence.'
Only one of the six family law textbooks surveyed, Modern
Family Law by Weisberg and Appleton, included any detailed
discussion of the euthanasia issue.' This discussion is embedded in
the section of the textbook entitled "Evolution of Right to Privacy"
and is introduced with an excerpt of Cruzan v. Missouri Department
of Health. This excerpt of the decision includes the summary of the
major facts and a portion of the majority's focus on the relationship
between the right to refuse medical treatment and the fundamental
right to privacy protected by the Constitution.' The textbook also
includes portions of the two concurring opinions of Justices
3. Although some texts included cases, such as Lawrence v. Texas, which cited landmark
euthanasia decisions, there was no separate discussion regarding this issue.
4. Namely, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
5. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2; CLARK & ESTtN, supra note 2.
6. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 151-152.
7. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 505.
8. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 69, 92-100.
9. Id at 92-95.
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O'Connor and Scalia, as well as the dissent by Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun. 0
Following the edited opinion, the textbook draws attention to
a variety of issues surrounding the euthanasia issue through several
notes." Some of the shorter notes illuminate the present controversy
by mentioning the conflicting traditions of prohibition against suicide
and the tradition of patient self-determination,12 the effect of the
differing visions of the family," and the competing interests between
the state and families present in these cases.' 4 Euthanasia is also
likened to the issue of abortion as one that requires a personal
choice.
Weisberg also includes a number of lengthier notes to further
elucidate issues surrounding euthanasia.16 One note discusses the
relationship between advance directives and euthanasia, drawing
special attention to a hypothetical situation had Nancy Cruzan
executed a "living will" under the Missouri statute. 7 This note further
expounds on the issue by summarizing the provisions of the Uniform
Health-Care Decisions Act and federal requirements for Medicare
providers.I
Another note references Justice Scalia's recommendation of
resorting to the Equal Protection Clause for this decision and then
includes a paragraph excerpt from Steven H. Miles and Allison
August's Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die"l9 as "evidence of
gender bias."2 0 Another note presents the issue of physician assisted
suicide.2 ' Within this discussion, both Washington v. Glucksberg and
10. Id. at 95-97.
11. Id. at 97-100.
12. Id. at 97.
13. Id at 98.
14. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 98.
15. Id. at 97-98.
16. Id. at 98-100.
17. Id. at 98.
18. Id. (within this issue, the textbook describes that one contentious issue within the health
care reform debates in 2009 was the extent to which Medicare should cover consultation regarding
end-of-life care. For further information on this topic, the textbook cites Robert Pear & David M.
Herszenhorn, As Bombast Escalates, a Primer on the Details of the Health Care Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009 at A8).
19. Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die", 18 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 87 (1990).
20. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 98-99 (also provides a citation to Susan M.
Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in FEMINISM
AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 282 (Susan M. Wolf ed. 1996)).
21. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 99.
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Vacco v. Quill are briefly summarized. The textbook states that in
Washington v. Glucksberg the Court "found that the asserted right to
die is not objectively rooted in American history and tradition and
defies the careful description required for protection as a fundamental
right."22 The summary goes on to describe the majority's emphasis on
the notion that the protected right in Cruzan was against forced
treatment (i.e., a battery) and that Casey's holding did not "warrant
the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and
personal decisions are so protected [as a fundamental right]."2 3 In the
same note, the textbook includes a summary of the companion case,
Vacco v. Quill, stating that the decision used similar reasoning to
uphold New York's ban against an equal protection challenge based
on the different legal consequences of physicians' termination of life-
sustaining treatment versus their affirmative assistance in hastening
death.24
Other notes discuss congressional prohibition on federal
funding for euthanasia, and the potential results of state
experimentation with euthanasia, with one note giving specific
attention to the Oregon law entitled the "Death with Dignity Act." 26
Within these notes, the textbook explores potential issues arising
from allowing states to legislate about euthanasia, summarizes the
relevant Oregon legislation and statistics relating to patients who
have died under the terms of that law, and the prohibition of federal
funds for assisted suicide.2 7 While these discussions present
interesting and valuable insight into the breadth of the euthanasia
issue, the text seems to leave out some important information such as
comparative studies with other countries that have allowed the
practice of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, the effect on
insurance coverage and other healthcare costs, as well as a more
detailed discussion of the effects of this issue on a family unit.
However, without the ability to compare this text's treatment of




25. Citing Rohith Srinivas, Exploring the Potential for American Death Tourism, 13 MICH.
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 91 (2009).
26. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 99-100.




the extent to which these notes provide a balanced overview of
euthanasia.
ABORTION
Unlike the coverage of euthanasia, every textbook surveyed
included some detailed discussion of abortion. Many textbooks
attempt to address abortion jurisprudence relatively extensively by
including it in sections entitled "Reproductive Rights and Interests," 28
"Abortion, Contraception, and Sterilization," 29 or other similarly
broad titles. Two textbooks, Contemporary Family Law, by Abrams,
and Family Law: Cases, Texts, Problems, by Ellman, include only the
portions of abortion jurisprudence related to more narrow family law
issues. Each textbook will be described, including a brief discussion
of the cases and notes within each text.
MODERN FAMILY LAW BY WEISBERG AND APPLETON
Weisberg begins its discussion of abortion with excerpts from
Roe v. Wade." The edited version contained in the textbook includes
portions from Sections 1, VI-XI, and two paragraphs from the
Rehnquist dissent, which summarize his disagreement with the
definition of the privacy right.' Following the edited opinion, the
textbook includes portions of the firsthand account of Sarah
Weddington, which summarizes some of the background of Roe v.
Wade, and text describing the issues surrounding Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, which ends describing the death of a
woman resulting from an illegal abortion which the author purports
could have prevented had there been a "choice of a safe and legal
abortion."3 2 Weisberg also includes a subsection entitled "Anti-
Abortion Laws: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives" in which
portions of Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood by Kristen
Luker; A Defense of Abortion by Judith Jarvis; and Abortion and the
28. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2.
29. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2.
30. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 20-27.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE (1993); Brief for the Amici
Curiae Women Who Have Had Abortions and Friends of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
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Sexual Agenda by Sidney Callahan, are included as examples of
scholarly work surrounding abortion."
Weisberg also includes several shorter notes which provoke
inquiries into the criticism of judicial activism from the "political
right" regarding the fundamental right in Roe and Roe's precedents,34
and summarizes two types of common statutory restrictions in the
Roe era and the companion case, Doe v. Bolton, which invalidated a
state's restrictions." Other notes include a discussion of Roe's
emphasis on viability, and formulating specific issues that may arise
as technology advances to push the time of viability earlier, and the
physician's role in evaluating and protecting the health of the mother
under a broad interpretation of "health." 6 Another note states that the
legalization of abortion provides a primary explanation for large
decreases in crime over the preceding decade." Lastly, the text
includes a note that examines abortion law in other countries and
contains a summary of Mary Ann Glendon's Abortion and Divorce in
Western Law, in which she contends that Roe put the United States in
a "class by itself.""
Two notes also examine the issues of gender equality and sex
discrimination within abortion." The text includes an excerpt from
Professor Sylvia Law as an example of a feminist commentator who
prefers an equal protection argument for the right to abortion,4 0 as
well as a summary of Professor Frances Olsen's comment,
"Unraveling Compromise," in which he discusses how far a state
should go to protect potential life and argues that to reduce abortion,
a state should provide a number of services for women. In a similar
vein, the text includes a note about abortion and motherhood which
33. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 34-38.
34. Id.at30-31.
35. Id. at 31 (including prohibition on abortion except to save the mother's life and the ALI
Model Penal Code's permission of abortion if pregnancy would seriously and permanently injure
the woman's health; if the fetus suffered from a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or
physical defect; or if the pregnancy resulted from rape).
36. Id
37. Id at 33 (citing John J. Donahue Ill & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime, 116 Q.J. ECON. 379, 414 (2001)).
38. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 33-34 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON.
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 22-25 (1987); and footnote citations to several
studies offering a variety of information about foreign abortion laws).
39. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 32-33.
40. Citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.REv. 375, 386 (1985); WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack




focuses on Kristin Luker's argument that pro-choice proponents
embrace feminist and progressive objectives while "abortion
opponents" believe that "motherhood-the raising of children and
families-is the most fulfilling role that women can have."4 1
The text continues the abortion topic with an edited excerpt of
Gonzales v. Carhart in a section of the textbook entitled "Burdens on
Privacy."42 Immediately following the edited opinion, the text
includes a two-page excerpt from Beyond the Slogans: Inside the
Abortion Clinic, by John Leland, containing abortion statistics,
physical descriptions of an abortion clinic, and personal stories.43
Following this article, there are several shorter notes exploring
several other aspects of abortion litigation. After inquiring into the
extent to which the Gonzales opinion reflects "an abortion
jurisprudence that follows Roe,"" one note focuses on the undue
burden standard by summarizing Casey as a joint opinion that
embraced the undue burden standard rather than a rational basis or
strict scrutiny standard, and summarizing Stenberg v. Carhart as the
case in which a majority embraced the undue burden standard.4 5
Another note examines the "abortion participants," discussing the
physician's role after Gonzales eliminated the "physician veto" and
the medical uncertainty surrounding abortion,46 as well as the
woman's role and possible psychological effects resulting from her
abortion decision.4 7
41. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 33 (citing KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND
THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 118 (1984); LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF
WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 304-305 (2002); Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of
Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 308-314 (1992); and Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility
for Life: How Abortion Serves Women's Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 97 (2009)).
42. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 39-47 (including portions of Parts I-V and
approximately two pages of Justice Ginsburg's dissent).
43. Id. at 47-49 (citing John Leland, Beyond the Slogans: Inside an Abortion Clinic, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005).
44. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 49-50.
45. Id. at 50.
46. Id. at 50-51 (citing Peter M. Ladwein, Note: Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v.
Carhart: The End of the Physician Veto and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Case:
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Abortion Rights- "Partial-Birth" Abortion, 121 HARV. L. REV.
265 (2007); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue ofJudicial Statesmanship, 86 TEx. L. REV. 959, 1022-1024
(2008); Rebecca E. Ivey, Note, Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a New
Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L. REV. 1451 (2008)).
47. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 51 (citing Reva B. Siegel, The Right's
Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of the Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument,
57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008); Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2011] 41
42 ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
A longer note follows, evaluating cases after Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton in which the limits of the Court's holdings were
tested.48 The issue of abortion funding leads this note and the text lists
Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Poelker v. Doe as cases permitting
states to refuse Medicaid for nontherapeutic abortions based on a
rational basis test for the state's encouragement of childbirth over
abortion.4 9 The text then includes a brief summary of Harris v.
McRae, stating that the "Court held that Roe's protection of the right
to abortion does not confer an entitlement to funds to realize that
right.""o The note then discusses the undue burden standard, citing
Justice O'Connor's dissent from City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. for an example of an early critic of Roe's
trimester framework, and defining the standard as one that "expressly
permits some measures 'designed to persuade [the woman] to choose
childbirth over abortion.'"' The note continues with a survey of the
informed consent issue mentioning the Court's upholding state
regulations mandating that physicians obtain prior written consent
from patients in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, summarizing the
proposed "Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2007," and
describing Rust v. Sullivan in which the Court "upheld regulations
disallowing physicians in federally funded clinics from discussing
abortion, despite the patient's request for information, the physician's
judgment that the patient should consider abortion, the health risks of
pregnancy, or state malpractice laws requiring disclosure."5 2 The note
21, 2007; Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 877 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008); Ashley Gorski, The Author of Her Trouble:
Abortion in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Judicial Discourses, 32 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 431 (2009); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REv. 277 (2007).
48. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 52-53.
49. Id at 52.
50. Id
51. Id at 52-53 (also citing Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (2008); Rachel Roth, Searching
for the State: Who Governs Prisoners' Reproductive Rights? in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 243-52 (Nancy
Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (in response to the issue of states refusing to assist in providing abortions
for incarcerated women)).
52. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 53 (also citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (U.S. 1983); Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. Pa. 1984); Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double
Bind Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1599 (2008); and The Science,
Law, and Politics ofFetal Pain Legislation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2002)).
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concludes by inquiring into the extent that the abortion cases reflect
changes in the Supreme Court's composition.53
Other notes in the text draw attention to the moral difference
between the abortion procedure that Gonzales bans and other
abortion techniques;5 4 discuss access to abortion issues;" survey some
of the government's limited responses to clinic violence, including
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE);56 draw a
relationship between modem birth control and abortion;" and
mention RU-486 and potential implications Gonzales may have on
laws surrounding the abortion pill." A final series of notes in the
text's abortion section gives a broad overview of several other legal
issues surrounding the abortion issue including transitory abortions,5
federal abortion laws regarding banning certain abortion procedures,
mention of a statute that "permits certain relatives of the fetus to sue
the physician for damages[,]" 60 mention of several states having fetal
homicide laws and brief summaries of federal fetal protection
53. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 53 (citing Robert K. Pushaw Jr., Partial-Birth
Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 527
(2008)).
54. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 53-54.
55. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 54 (citing Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion,
Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865 (2007); and footnote cites to several
other statistics and articles).
56. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 54-55 (citing William Alex Pridemore & Josua
Freilich, The Impact of State Laws Protecting Abortion Clinics and Reproductive Rights on
Crimes Against Abortion Providers: Deterrence, Backlash or Neither?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
611 (2007); David Barstow, An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009
at Al).
57. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 55 (citing Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d
519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
58. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 55 (citing Cordray v. Planned Parenthood
Cincinatti Region, 911 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio 2009); Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory
Ultrasound and the Path to Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008)).
59. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 55-56 (citing Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender,
Abortion, and Travel After Roe's End, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 655 (2007); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If
Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUis U. L.J.
611 (2007)).
60. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 56 (citing Keith S. Alexander, Federalism,
Abortion, and the Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power: Can
Congress Ban Partial Birth Abortion After Carhart?, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 106 (2008); 18
U.S.C. 1531 (c), (e) (2006); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional
Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753 (2006); Maya Manian, Privatizing Bans on Abortion:
Eviscerating Constitutional Rights through Tort Remedies, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 123 (2007); Jennifer
L. Achilles, Comment, Using Tort Law to Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other Pesky Due Process
Decisions: An Examination of Louisiana's Act 825, 78 TUL. L. REV. 853 (2004)).
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measures,61 and a short history of the increasing power of the federal
government over family law matters.62
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS BY CLARK AND ESTIN
Clark begins its treatment of abortion with excerpts from the
Roe v. Wade opinion, including portions from Parts I, V, VII-XII,
and Rehnquist's dissent." Following the edited opinion, the textbook
includes a paragraph summary of the Doe v. Bolton decision,
containing both a brief description of the facts of the case and the
holding.'
After providing this information on the two companion cases,
Clark includes several notes that further illuminate issues surrounding
the abortion issue. One note unique to the Clark text offers a balanced
view absent in the other texts by exploring a number of criticisms of
the Roe v. Wade opinion.65 One criticism states that Roe failed to
establish the legitimacy of the decision by not articulating a precept
of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a
political judgment,6 6 another contends that Roe had no support in the
text of the Constitution,67 another says that the woman's right
announced by Roe could not be inferred from the Constitution," and
the final article advocates that the abortion issue be left to
legislatures, as that would have "enabled them to work out a better
balance between the interests of the mother and those of the fetus."69
Another note that Clark discusses with increased balance compared
to other texts relates to the question of when life begins. o First stating
61. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 56-57 (describes the "Unborn Victims of
Violence Act" and revisions to the State Children's Health Insurance Program which includes the
unborn in the definition of child, as well as a summary of two opposing views of these revisions
from Angela Hooton, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing
Mainstream and Latina Feminism, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 59, 68, 81-82 (2005)).
62. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 57 (citing several federal statutes, including a
string of citations to articles at the end of the note relating to "federalism in family law").
63. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 168-178.
64. Id. at 178.
65. Id at 178-179.
66. Id at 178 (citing Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court and Abortion, 2 HUM. LIFE REV.
15, 18 (1976)).
67. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 178 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW, 112-115 (1990)).
68. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 178-179 (citing John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973)).
69. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 179 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 58-62 (1987)).
70. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 179.
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that Roe's conclusion that the unborn are not included under
Fourteenth Amendment protection has been strenuously disputed, the
text continues the discussion by briefly summarizing John A.
Robertson's In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos
and introducing the difficulty in determining the boundary between
abortion and contraception." Next, the text offers several summaries
of other constitutional arguments that have been suggested for the
holding in Roe including those offered by Philip B. Heymann and
Douglas Barzelay,7 2 Donald Regan,'7 Robert Goldstein, 74  Eileen
McDonagh,7 Sylvia Law,7' and provides several citations for other
similar arguments.77
Another series of notes in the text examine statistics
surrounding the public opinion of abortion,7 the decline in the
availability of abortion since 1990,79 and the various acts of violence
towards abortion clinics, including Congress's response of the
FACE."0 A final note after the Roe opinion includes a long string
citation of relevant abortion cases and small paragraph summaries of
issues that define "the scope of abortion rights and how far states may
go to try to discourage or prevent abortions."" The issues the text
summarizes include the Court's striking down of requirements that
71. Id at 179 (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN
THE SEVENTIES (1979); John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos,
76 VA. L. REV. 437, 441-443 (1990); and a string citation with various articles discussing issues
surrounding the line between contraception and abortion).
72. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 180 (citing Philip B. Heymann and Douglas Barzelay,
The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rev. 765 (1973)).
73. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 180 (citing Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade,
77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979)).
74. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 180 (citing Robert D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and
Abortion: A Legal Interpretation, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 349 (1989)).
75. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 180 (citing EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE
ABORTION DEADLOCK (1996)).
76. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 180-181 (citing Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 PA. L. REV. 955, 1008, 1013-1028 (1984)).
77. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 181 (string cite of several articles).
78. Id. at 181 (citing Eric M Uslander and Ronal E. Weber, Public Support for Pro-Choice
Abortion Policies in the Nation and States: Changes and Stability After the Roe and Doe
Decisions, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1772 (1979)).
79. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 181 (citing Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort,
Abortion Services in the United States, 1991 and 1992, 26 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 100
(1994)).
80. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 182 (also citing several cases upholding the
constitutionality of the FACE statute).
81. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 182-185 (includes such cases as Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 416, Am. College, 737 F.2d 283, and
several others).
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all abortions be performed in hospitals, prohibition of saline
amniocentesis and partial-birth abortion, record-keeping
requirements, informed consent procedures, spousal notification and
consent, parental notification and consent, prohibition on public
funding, waiting periods, and provisions regarding fetal viability.8 2
The note concludes with a discussion of the changes in Supreme
Court membership and three short paragraphs analyzing recent
abortion case law."
Clark continues its discussion of abortion with an excerpted
opinion of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.8 4
This edited version includes portions of Parts I, II, IV, and Justice
Stevens' concurrence in part and dissent in part." Following the
opinion, the text provides a paragraph summarizing both Justices
Stewart and Powell's concurring opinion, and Justices White,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger's dissent.8 6 Clark then includes
an excerpt of Casey, focusing only on Part V-C, which considers the
spousal notification provision. After this shortened opinion, the text
gives a paragraph summary of the Chief Justice's dissent, draws
attention to the Court's distinction between parental consent and
spousal consent requirements, draws attention to the domestic
violence statistics included in the opinion, and cites Coe v. County of
Cook as an opinion that provides authority for the rights of non-
marital fathers."
Clark then provides the edited opinion of Bellotti v. Baird,
including portions of Parts I-IV.8 9 The notes following this case
include a paragraph providing brief summaries of Stevens'
concurrence, Rehnquist's concurrence, and White's dissent;90 a
discussion of the relationship between the Bellotti and Danforth
decisions;" a list of questions and issues raised by the mature minor
exception; 9 2 and an inquiry into whether the Bellotti decision
82. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 183-184.
83. Id. at 184-185.
84. Id. at 185-190.
85. Id at 185-188 (the textbook provides summaries of Part IV-A, IV-E, IV-F, and IV-G,
and excerpts from Part IV-C and IV-D).
86. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 190.
87. Id. at 190-197.
88. Id. at 197.
89. Id at 197-208.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id. at 208-209.
92. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2 at 209 (citing Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitution and
the Anomaly of the Pregnant Teenager, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 553 (1982)).
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adequately respects the right of parents to protect and make medical
decisions for their children.3
Excerpts of Hodgson v. Minnesota follow, including edited
versions of Parts I-IV, VI, VII, and Kennedy's concurrence in
judgment in part and dissent in part. 94 The text provides several notes
following the decision including a summary of Ohio v. Akron Center
of Reproductive Health, in which a single parent notification with a
judicial bypass was upheld,95 the issues that state constitutions may
introduce to the questions of parental consent,96 a description of
conclusions regarding judicial bypass proceedings from Judging
Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized
Abortions, by Patricia Donovan,97 a summary of differing results
regarding the "maturity" of minors in several court decisions,98 and
the issue of parental support with non-consenting parents and
potential obligations of the grandparent. 99
FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS BY SWISHER, MILLER,
AND SINGER
The abortion topic is embedded in a section of the book
entitled "Having Children: The Alternative Choices" and begins with
an excerpted opinion of Roe v. Wade.'00 Similar to the other texts that
include an edited version of Roe, Swisher provides portions of Parts
I, II, VI-XII, and Rehnquist's dissent. The text provides several short
notes immediately following the decision including an evaluation of
the symmetry of Blackmun's opinion,"o' and a note stating that
regarding the right to privacy established in Roe, the majority is not
concerned with "establishing a theory of constitutional interpretation
to support the belief in the existence of the right."l 02 Another series of
short notes pertains to when life begins stating that "viability is not a
fixed moment,"03 that the point of viability could be moved back as
93. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 209.
94. Id at 219-223 (including portions of Parts I, 11, IV, and V).
95. Id at 223-224.
96. Id at 224.
97. Id at 225 (citing Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They
Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259 (1980)).
98. CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 2, at 225.
99. Id at 225.
100. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 243.
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scientific discoveries advance,'0 4 and that "pro-life or anti-abortion
advocates" criticize allowing abortion based on the belief that life
begins at the moment of conception."o5
The notes continue with a longer note that examines
subsequent cases defining the parameters of several abortion issues.10 6
Within this note, the text briefly examines Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth and the issue of spousal consent, Doe v. Bolton
and the issue of performing abortions in hospitals, the issue of public
funding as addressed in several cases,o' and the issue of minor
consent (stating that the basic rule "is that a state can statutorily
require parental consent by one parent as long as there is a provision
for judicial bypass").0 " The note also includes a section of
"miscellaneous" cases that further discuss the scope of abortion
issues by providing summaries of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.109
The book next includes the longest excerpted opinion of
Casey presented in any of the texts." 0 This edited version includes
sections of Parts I, II, IV, V, VI, and approximately one page of
Justice Scalia's concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part. "
After the opinion, the text provides a list of the issues considered in
Casey, each with a "tally of how the justices voted on each of the
issues" to better illustrate the case's complexity."2 The text also
provides three further notes about the decision including an
observation that the Justices did not vote along party lines in the
case,113 an indication that recent Supreme Court appointees have a
104. Id
105. Id at 253 (suggests formulating an argument against Roe conceding that "it is impossible
to know when, or at least to reach a consensus as to when, life begins").
106. SWISHER et al., supra note 2 at 253-256.
107. Id. at 254 (providing cites and parenthetical explanations for Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), Harris, 448
U.S. at 297, Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991)).
108. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 254 (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health,
497 U.S. 502 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); HL, 450 U.S. at 398; Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)).
109. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 255-256.
110. Id at 256-265.
111. Id. (Part V includes portions from Parts V-B, V-C, and V-D).
112. Id. at 266-267.
113. 1d. at 267.
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pro-choice bent,'l 4 and a summary of the stare decisis portion of the
opinion which the text chose to leave out of the edited version.'"
Lastly, Swisher includes several other brief notes, which
survey a variety of developments in the abortion issue."' The first of
these notes summarizes the Freedom of Choice Act of 1992 as a
desire to codify the Supreme Court's holding in Roe."' Another note
discusses the RU-486 pill, giving information about the procedure the
pill induces, the history of the pill in the United States, and arguments
in favor and against use of the drug."' A pair of notes gives examples
of violence at abortion clinicsil 9 and evaluates the Court's response to
demonstrations surrounding abortion.120 These two notes summarize
the Supreme Court decisions of Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic and Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, as
well as the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994.12 A
final note in the abortion section of Swisher summarizes provisions
of the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 1996, noting, however, that it had
not yet been enacted.122
FAMILY LAW BY HARRIS, TEITELBAUM, AND CARBONE
In Harris's short discussion of abortion, under the heading
entitled "Reproductive Choice," Roe is summarized in four short
paragraphs 2 3 and Casey is summarized in approximately a page. 24
114. Id.
115. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 267-268 (stating that "[s]ince the factual assumptions
and the law have not changed, overruling Roe would be based upon a doctrinal difference-and
that is not a good reason to overrule a constitutional case-except for the most egregious cases
such as Lochner or Plessy v. Ferguson").
116. Id. at 268-270.
117. Id.at268.
118. Id. at 268 269 (Brooks, RU-486: Politics ofAbortion and Science, 2 J. PHARM. & L. 261
(1993); Canlen, The Long Labor of RU-486, CAL. LAWYER, 34 (May 1997); Hanson, Approval of
RU-486 as a Postcoital Contraceptive, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163 (1993)).
119. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 270 (citing McMurtry & Pennock, Ending the Violence:
Applying the Ku Klux Klan Act, RICO, and FACE to the Abortion Controversy, 30 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 203 (1995)).
120. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 269-270.
121. Id. at 269-270 (also citing Helen R. Franco, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1994: The Face of Things to Come?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1083, 1097, 1107 (1995).
122. SWISHER et al., supra note 2, at 270.
123. HARRIS et al., supra note 2, at 135 (summarizing Justice Blackmun's opinion that right to
privacy is a fundamental right, that Texas, by holding to one of many views of the status of a
fetus, could not "override the rights of the pregnant woman; also summarizing Justice Rehnquist's
dissent stating that the right to privacy did not include a right to terminate a pregnancy nor that it
was accorded the protection of a fundamental right).
124. Id. at 135-36 (summarizing Justice O'Connor's focus on stare decisis, stating that the
basic decision in Roe was not repudiated, although specific tests employed in Roe were rejected).
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The text then summarizes the more recent case of Gonzales v.
Carhart, including about one page of excerpts from the majority
opinion, as well as excerpts from three paragraphs of Justice
Ginsberg's dissent.'25
Following these introductory summaries, Harris includes
significantly shortened versions of both Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth and Casey.'26 Both of these edited
versions focus on spousal consent and spousal notification and are
followed by a couple of short notes, which raise questions and
discuss the issue in more detail. One note inquires as to whether there
may be some intermediate ground between husband and wife, rather
than the "zero-sum game" involved in Danforth's majority.'2 7
Another note mentions Casey's upholding of the parental notification
provision and provides a question that requires examining the
difference between parental notification and spousal notification.'28
Yet another note discusses the "access of a woman of limited means
to abortion," summarizing the Hyde Amendment and a number of
states that have enacted similar provisions.129 Lastly, Harris provides
a string cite to several articles discussing the "relationship between
the right to abortion and the constitution of the family" with a
parenthetical after each citation offering a sentence explanation of the
article's content.130
FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS BY ELLMAN, KURTZ, SCOTT,
WEITHORN, AND Bix
The Family Law text by Ellman includes the abortion issue as
part of the section that discusses minors. The text introduces the issue
with excerpts of the Bellotti v. Baird opinion."' The edited version of
this opinion includes portions of Parts I-IV, as well as a summary of
Justice Stevens' concurrence in judgment.132
125. Id. at 136-38.
126. Id. at 138-42.
127. Id at 140.
128. Id. at 142.
129. Id. at 142-43 (citing Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Restrictions on Medicaid Funding for
Abortions: A Literature Review 3 (Guttmacher Institute, June 2009)).
130. HARRIS et al., supra note 2, at 143 (including Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); Carol
Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 789
(2006); and Naomi Chan & June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, Aug. 16, 2007, GWU
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 343).
131. ELLMAN et al., supra note 2, at 1107-13.
132. Id at 1107-13.
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Following this excerpt, there are several notes in the textbook,
including a summary of Massachusetts law after the Bellotti decision
that provides an excerpt by Professor Robert Mnookin's article
Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case.'" A pair of notes following this
summary of Massachusetts law differentiates between parental
consent provisions'34 and parental notification statutes, and also
provides a summary excerpt of the H.L. v. Matheson majority opinion
and a portion of Justice Marshall's dissent, as well as a summary
excerpt of the Hodgson v. Minnesota decision.' In these two notes, a
few other cases are mentioned in lesser detail, as well as two articles:
Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortion Decisions by Henshaw
and Kost, and Protecting Our Daughters: The Need for the Vermont
Parental Notification Law by Collett.13 6
Another note discusses the issue of determining a minor's
maturity and to show the reality that courts do not apply a consistent
standard in this determination; the Ellman textbook offers several
summaries of court decisions in which judges placed importance and
value on different characteristics of a young woman.' Also included
in this note are inquiries provoked by Developmental Trends in
Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to
Abortion by Amuel and Rappaport as well as a statement by the
Interdivisional Committee on adolescent abortion. A final note in
Ellman briefly analyzes how "some courts have interpreted their state
constitutions to provide more protection of minors' abortion rights
than has been recognized under the federal Constitution" and offers a
concluding evaluation by Martin Guggenheim's Minor Rights:
Adolescent Abortion Cases. 3 8
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW BY ABRAMS, CAHN, Ross, AND MEYER
The Abrams text includes the abortion issue as it relates to
"Medical Decisionmaking for One's Spouse," and begins the
discussion of abortion with an excerpt of Casey.13 9 This version of
133. Id at 1113-14 (citing Robert Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN 239-40 (R. Mnookin et al., eds. 1985)).
134. ELLMAN et at., supra note 2, at 1114 (string citation of several cases).
135. Id. at 1114-17.
136. Id. at 1117.
137. Id at 1117-20.
138. Id at 1120-21 (citing Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30
HOFSTRA L. REv. 589 (2002)).
139. ABRAMS etal.,supra note 2, at 214.
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Casey includes portions of Parts I, II, V-C, Blackmun's concurrence
in part, concurrence in judgment in part, and dissent in part, and
Rehnquist's concurrence in judgment in part and dissent in part.140
Following this portion of the decision, the text then includes a
summary of Bellotti v. Baird, along with issues raised by An
Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information by
Catherine J. Ross and "Special Weight"for Best-Interests: Minors in
the New Era ofParental Autonomy by Richard F. Storrow and Sandra
Martinez. 141
As a conclusion to its discussion of abortion, Abrams
provides a longer note entitled "Casey's Vitality" in which it offers
summaries of more recent abortion jurisprudence.142 After briefly
summarizing the holdings of Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England and Stenberg v. Carhart, the text includes a
longer summary of the Gonzales v. Carhart decision.143 This
summary of the opinion includes approximately four paragraphs of
Kennedy's majority opinion, a brief description of Thomas and
Scalia's concurrence, and approximately eight paragraphs from
Justice Ginsburg's dissent.'4 4
CONCLUSION
In the six leading family law textbooks surveyed there
appeared to be a "right-to-choice" bias in the abortion and euthanasia
issues. While there was little discussion of euthanasia in the
textbooks, there were arguments and issues missing from the small
amount of text that was provided. There would be value to covering
the euthanasia issue with more breadth and depth, as several
relationships between euthanasia and family law exist.
The textbooks treated the relevant abortion cases in a fairly
uniform way, but the bias presented itself most strongly in the notes
selected to further illuminate the jurisprudence and controversy
surrounding the cases. The texts that provide the most coverage,
Weisberg and Appleton, and Clark and Estin, are the only ones to
provide any critique of the monumental Roe decision. While the
140. Id. at 214-22.
141. Id. at 223-24 (also citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
16 Cal. 4th 307 (1997)).
142. ABRAMS et al., supra note 2, at 224.




citations of these critiques are notable within these two texts, the
discussion of these topics was comparatively short, and edited to such
an extent it was difficult to fully explore the criticisms of pro-choice
arguments. The other texts focus on more narrow issues of abortion,
and as a result, offer little criticism of the abortion issue as a whole,
focusing more on the extent to which abortion should be regulated
and the inconsistency courts have displayed, particularly in
determining a "mature minor."
The bias in the texts also presents itself in the language and
phrases chosen to convey the issues and the conflicting sides. Rather
than referring to the pro-life side as "pro-life," many texts more often
referred to that group as "anti-abortion." Another example of the bias
within the textbooks' language is one heading used to introduce the
Gonzales v. Carhart opinion: "Burdens on Privacy."'4 5 Finally, in
discussing the euthanasia issue, as mentioned before, one textbook
compares the choice to die to the choice to have an abortion,
categorizing them both as private choices. 4 6 This specific comparison
and categorization is the general tenor found throughout the texts,
implying that whatever one's choice may be regarding abortion or
euthanasia, either decision is viable, and most importantly, it is a
choice for the particular person to make based on individual
circumstances.
145. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 2, at 39.
146. Id. at 97-98.
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